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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3117 
___________ 
 
SEAN TAPP, 
                                                 Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DANNY BRAZILL; ANDY PROTO; LANCASTER COUNTY PRISON; 
SGT. JACOBS; C/O L. GRIER; C/O MILLER; NURSE CARRIE MEDINA; 
C/O CANNEFIELD; C/O MARIN; SGT. R. WOLFFE; LANCASTER COUNTY 
PRISON MED. DEPT.; WARDEN GUARDEENI; ROBERT SAMASKO; DR. YUNG; 
C/O RODER; C/O HERSH; RN VAL B., Medical Staff; RN LAURIE HOSTEDER; 
THE CITY OF LANCASTER COUNTY; C/O B. JOHNSON, #27 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5:11-cv-00677) 
District Judge:  Honorable Petrese B. Tucker 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 22, 2016 
Before: FUENTES, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 24, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Sean Tapp challenges three orders entered by the District Court in 
his civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm each of those orders. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background 
of this case, we discuss that background only briefly.  The allegations in this case concern 
the time period from January 2009 to August 2009, when Tapp was incarcerated in the 
Lancaster County Prison (“LCP”).  During the majority of that time period, Tapp was a 
pretrial detainee.1 
 In January 2011, Tapp filed a pro se complaint in the District Court against twenty 
defendants, raising a host of claims.  Five of the defendants provided medical services to 
LCP; we refer to those defendants as the “Medical Defendants.”  Another group of 
defendants — the “LCP Defendants” — consisted of LCP itself and twelve LCP prison 
officers/officials.  The remaining two defendants were the “City of Lancaster County” (it 
appears from Tapp’s complaint that he intended to sue the City of Lancaster, not 
Lancaster County) and Andy Proto, who was employed by Aramark Correctional 
Services, LLC, as a general manager of food services at LCP. 
                                              
1 In July 2009, Tapp was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of possession with intent 
to deliver a controlled substance.  See Commonwealth v. Tapp, 997 A.2d 1201, 1202 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2010).  He is currently incarcerated in one of Pennsylvania’s state correctional 
institutions. 
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 Shortly after the complaint was served, the Medical Defendants moved to dismiss 
the claims against them for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  On December 13, 2011, the District Court granted that motion. 
 In September 2012, Tapp successfully moved for a default judgment against Proto, 
who had yet to respond to the complaint.  However, in December 2013, Proto moved to 
vacate that judgment.  Proto averred that he had not worked at LCP since April 2010, and 
that an LCP corrections officer had accepted service on his behalf without his or 
Aramark’s permission.  Proto further averred that he himself did not learn of the default 
judgment until September 2013.  On January 28, 2014, the District Court entered an order 
granting Proto’s motion.  Shortly thereafter, Proto moved to dismiss the claims against 
him pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  On June 10, 2014, the District Court entered an order 
granting that motion to dismiss. 
 The claims against the LCP Defendants took a different course.  The relevant 
parties conducted discovery and eventually filed cross motions for summary judgment.  
On June 10, 2014 (in a different order than the one involving the claims against Proto), 
the District Court granted the LCP Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and 
denied Tapp’s cross motion.  In the same order, the District Court dismissed the claims 
against the City of Lancaster for lack of prosecution and directed the District Court Clerk 
to close the case.  This timely appeal followed.2 
                                              
2 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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II. 
 We begin by outlining the scope of our review.  Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 3(c) states, inter alia, that a notice of appeal must “designate the judgment, 
order, or part thereof being appealed.”  Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B).  We liberally construe 
this requirement, see Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d 766, 776 (3d Cir. 1999), and “[w]e have 
held that when an appellant gives notice that he is appealing from a final order, failing to 
refer specifically to earlier orders disposing of other claims or other parties does not 
preclude us from reviewing those orders.”  Shea v. Smith, 966 F.2d 127, 129 (3d Cir. 
1992).  Indeed, we have exercised jurisdiction over orders not specified in the notice of 
appeal when “(1) there is a connection between the specified and unspecified orders; 
(2) the intention to appeal the unspecified order is apparent; and (3) the opposing party is 
not prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief the issues.”  Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army 
Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Polonski v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 
137 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1998)).    
 In this case, Tapp’s notice of appeal specifically referred only to the District 
Court’s final order — the June 10, 2014 order that, inter alia, granted the LCP 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and closed the case.3  However, his appellate 
                                              
3 Although Tapp’s notice of appeal also alluded to the District Court’s January 28, 2014 
order granting Proto’s motion to vacate the default judgment, Tapp has waived any 
challenge to that order.  See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster 
Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived unless a party raises 
it in [his] opening brief, and for those purposes a passing reference to an issue will not 
suffice to bring that issue before this court.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Even if 
5 
 
brief also challenges the December 13, 2011 order dismissing the Medical Defendants 
and the June 10, 2014 order dismissing Proto.  Given that (1) there is a connection 
between those two dismissal orders and the District Court’s final order (the two dismissal 
orders could not be appealed until the final order was entered), (2) Tapp’s intent to appeal 
the two dismissal orders is evident from his appellate brief, and (3) the relevant 
defendants have not been prejudiced and have had the opportunity to fully brief the issues 
that stem from the two dismissal orders, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to review 
those two orders (along with the District Court’s final order).  See Sulima, 602 F.3d at 
184; see also Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 972 n.14 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing cases 
where we have exercised jurisdiction under similar circumstances).       
 We review the District Court’s dismissal of the Medical Defendants and Proto, as 
well as its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the LCP Defendants, under a 
de novo standard.  See Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 
2011).  “To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ‘a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’”  Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).  Meanwhile, summary 
judgment is appropriate when the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
                                                                                                                                                  
we were to reach the merits of Tapp’s challenge to that order, we would affirm because 
the District Court acted within its discretion in granting Proto’s motion to vacate the 
default judgment.  See Zawadski de Bueno v. Bueno Castro, 822 F.2d 416, 419-20 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (discussing factors to consider when reviewing a district court’s decision to 
vacate a default judgment). 
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any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a).  Although the non-movant’s evidence “is to be believed, and all justifiable 
inferences are to be drawn in his favor in determining whether a genuine factual question 
exists,” summary judgment should be granted “unless there is sufficient evidence for a 
jury to reasonably find for the nonmovant.”  Barefoot Architect, Inc., 632 F.3d at 826 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Lastly, we review for abuse of discretion the District 
Court’s dismissal of the claims against the City of Lancaster for failure to prosecute.  See 
Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 260 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011).  We may 
affirm the District Court’s decisions on any basis supported by the record.  See Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).              
III. 
 We begin our review with the District Court’s dismissal of the claims against the 
Medical Defendants.  These claims alleged, inter alia, that Tapp was intentionally 
misdiagnosed with Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (“MRSA”), that he was 
not receiving his MRSA medication (this allegation is at odds with the previous 
allegation), and that Tapp was required to sign a form before receiving treatment for a 
boil on or near his armpit.  The District Court concluded that Tapp’s 
constitutional/federal claims failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  The 
District Court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law 
claims against the Medical Defendants. 
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 For substantially the reasons given by the District Court, we agree that Tapp’s 
claims against the Medical Defendants were inadequate to proceed.4  However, before 
dismissing claims under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court must give the plaintiff an 
opportunity to amend them, unless such amendment would be futile or inequitable.  See 
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  Here, it does not 
appear that the District Court considered whether Tapp should be given an opportunity to 
amend.  Nevertheless, remand is not necessary.  Prior to appellate briefing, the Clerk of 
this Court directed Tapp and the Medical Defendants to address the leave-to-amend issue 
in their respective briefs.  Although Tapp’s brief contends that the District Court “fail[ed] 
to let [him] amend his claims,” (Appellant’s Br. 5), he does not expound on this 
contention.  Indeed, even though more than four years have passed since the District 
Court dismissed the claims against the Medical Defendants, Tapp’s brief does not allege 
any additional facts with respect to these claims, let alone facts that would state a claim 
under Rule 12(b)(6).  Under these circumstances, we conclude that amendment of the 
claims against the Medical Defendants would be futile.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of these claims. 
                                              
4 The District Court analyzed Tapp’s inadequate medical care claims under the Eighth 
Amendment’s “deliberate indifference” standard.  See Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. 
Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing that standard).  Because it appears 
that Tapp’s inadequate medical care claims arose while he was a pretrial detainee, those 
claims are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, not the Eighth 
Amendment.  See id. at 581.  That said, remand is not necessary because the Eighth 
Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard applies equally to inadequate medical care 
claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. at 581-82.         
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 We next consider the District Court’s dismissal of the claims against Proto.  
Tapp’s complaint alleged that  
[o]n 1-30-09[,] plaintiff served notice on Mr. Andy Proto that 
he would like to be fed kosher meals in accordance with his 
religious beliefs.  On 2-2-09[,] Mr. Proto responded back to 
plaintiff’s request[,] informing him to either be a vegetarian 
or eat non[-]kosher regular population meals, if he wants to 
eat meat.  This is religious discrimination[,] retaliation, cruel 
& unusual punishment & the conspiracy can be inferred from 
these overt acts.  Also a 5th & 14th amendment violation[,] 
too. 
 
(Suppl. App. at 41.)  The District Court concluded that these allegations failed to state a 
claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  The District Court stated, inter alia, that “a prison does not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause by offering an all-cold kosher diet which lacks meat,” 
(Dist. Ct. Order entered June 10, 2014, at 2 n.1, located at Dist. Ct. docket no. 61 (citing 
Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by 
DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 55 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc))), and that Tapp’s complaint 
did not allege “that the vegetarian diet provided was non-kosher or nutritionally 
inadequate.”  (Id.) 
 For substantially the reasons given by the District Court, we agree that the claims 
against Proto in Tapp’s complaint failed to satisfy Rule 12(b)(6).  The question that 
remains is whether the District Court should have afforded Tapp leave to amend these 
claims.  In Tapp’s opposition to Proto’s motion to dismiss, Tapp alleged, inter alia, that 
he was being served “non kosher regular population vegetarian meals,” and that a “kosher 
vegan tray” offered to him by Proto was not kosher either.  But Tapp did not allege facts 
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indicating why those meal offerings were not kosher.  Furthermore, although the Clerk of 
this Court instructed Tapp to brief whether he should have been given leave to amend, his 
appellate brief does not provide any further insight into these claims.  Under these 
circumstances, we conclude that amendment would be futile, and we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of the claims against Proto. 
 Next, we consider the District Court’s decision to grant the LCP Defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment.  The District Court issued a 39-page opinion explaining 
why the many claims against these defendants lack merit.  For substantially the reasons 
set forth in that opinion, we agree with the District Court that the claims discussed therein 
lack merit.5  To the extent that Tapp’s complaint intended to raise issues that were not 
specifically addressed in that opinion, we conclude that remand is not necessary because 
he has not articulated a claim that would survive summary judgment.  Accordingly, we 
will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the LCP 
Defendants. 
 Lastly, we review the District Court’s dismissal of the claims against the City of 
Lancaster for failure to prosecute.  As a general matter, before a district court enters such 
                                              
5 The District Court analyzed Tapp’s failure-to-protect claim under the Eighth 
Amendment, employing the deliberate indifference standard.  However, because it 
appears that the allegations undergirding this claim stem from Tapp’s time as a pretrial 
detainee, the Fourteenth Amendment actually governed this claim.  See Thomas v. 
Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014).  Nevertheless, the District 
Court’s invocation of the Eighth Amendment was harmless because the deliberate 
indifference standard applies equally to failure-to-protect claims under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See id.       
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a dismissal, that court must weigh the six factors set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).  See Knoll v. City of Allentown, 707 
F.3d 406, 409 (3d Cir. 2013).  It does not appear that the District Court considered those 
factors in this case.  Nevertheless, remand is not necessary because there was an 
alternative basis for dismissing the claims against the City of Lancaster.  When, as here, 
the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the District Court may dismiss claims sua sponte 
if they fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and amendment would be 
inequitable or futile.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108.  We 
have examined the several claims brought against the City of Lancaster and conclude that 
dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) was appropriate as to each of them.6  Accordingly, we 
will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the City of Lancaster from this case. 
 In sum, we agree with the District Court’s decision to dismiss the claims against 
the Medical Defendants, Proto, and the City of Lancaster.  We also agree with the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the LCP Defendants.  As a result, we will 
affirm each of three District Court orders at issue here.       
                                              
6 Each of these claims was conclusory in nature and has remained undeveloped in the 
more than five years since Tapp filed his complaint. 
